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Abstract The paper studies the influence of Tullock (West Econ J 5:224–232,
1967) and the rent-seeking literature more generally on the study of corruption. The
theoretical corruption literature with its emphasis on principal-agent relationships
within government and rent creation by corruption politicians has largely, but not
entirely, overlooked that contestable rents encourage unproductive use of real
resources in seeking these rents. As a consequence, the literature underestimates the
value of corruption control and the cost of corruption itself.
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1 Introduction
For the modern reader, it is quite an eye-opener to go back and read Gordon
Tullock’s paper ‘‘The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft’’ published in
1967 in the Western Economic Journal (now Economic Inquiry). The paper is very
short and to the point, uses a few simple diagrams, and does not exhibit a single
equation or a statistical table of any kind. Yet, it contains one of the most powerful
new insights emerging from twentieth century economic thought, laid out clearly
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towards the end of the paper. The insight, of course, is that the social cost of
government policy (monopoly, transfers, regulation, etc.) is much greater than
suggested by the calculation of Harberger triangles and deadweight cost. The source
of the extra cost is the contesting of rents created by the policies by potential
beneficiaries expending real resources. This, along with Tullock’s (1980) paper on
‘‘Efficient rent seeking’’ started a huge literature on rent seeking—the term coined
by Krueger (1974) for the activities described by Tullock.1
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the influence of the rent-seeking literature
on the study of the economics of corruption. The terms ‘‘rent seeking’’ and
‘‘corruption’’ are often used interchangeably. Closer inspection of the academic
literature, however, reveals that the two literatures have proceeded in parallel to a
surprisingly large extent. I shall argue that this is unhelpful and that both the rent-
seeking and the corruption literature can benefit from each other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a taxonomy that
helps set the stage for the rest of the analysis. Section 3 provides a brief overview of
the theoretical corruption literature. Section 4 evaluates the influence of the rent-
seeking literature on the study of corruption. Section 5 inquiries into the influence
of the corruption literature on the study of rent seeking. Section 6 engages with the
relationship between empirical research on corruption and rent seeking. Section 7
provides some concluding remarks.
2 The core concepts, definitions and taxonomy
In this section, I briefly review the two main insights from Tullock (1967) and
propose a general taxonomy that can help clarify the link between corruption and
rent seeking.
2.1 The core ideas of the rent-seeking literature
It is useful, I think, to start by clarifying the main ideas and concepts, even if they
are familiar to most readers. The rent-seeking literature embodies two core ideas,
which can both be found in Tullock (1967). The insights are:
1. The missiles seek heat hypothesis: A contestable rent induces rent-seeking
activities aimed at capturing the rent. These activities involve unproductive use
of real resources and cause a social loss.
2. The invertability hypothesis: Rent-seeking costs are, by and large, unobserved
but by applying contest theory and assumptions about the behaviour of rent
seekers, the size of the social cost can be inferred from the value of the
contestable rent.
1 The rent-seeking literature has been surveyed by Nitzan (1994), Tollison (1997), Congleton et al.
(2008), Hillman (2013), and Long (2013 [2015]). The papers in Congleton and Hillman (2015)
summarize the different dimensions of the rent-seeking literature.
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Examples of contestable rents are abundant: assigningmonopoly rights, protectionist
trade policies, privileged budget allocations, income transfers, national resource rights,
and so on. The distinguishing feature making a rent contestable is that ex ante—i.e.,
before it is assigned to any particular economic agent—it is up for grabs. This is what
makes it rational for potential beneficiaries to expend resources in contesting rents.
Contestable rents differ from contestable profits, which trigger socially produc-
tive activities (Buchanan 1980). Contestable profits play an important and efficiency
enhancing role in the allocation of resources in a capitalist market economy.
Economic agents have an incentive to expand into markets with profits and to
innovate to create profits; this improves resource allocation, expands output of the
economy and increases aggregate welfare.
Many contestable rents are created and protected by government policy and
government officials and politicians are gatekeepers who regulate who gains access
to the rents. This is what Tullock had in mind. In this case, economic agents cannot
contest the rent by shifting resources directly into production of the underlying good
or service. Instead, they are motivated to invest time, effort and other real
resources—to engage in rent-seeking activities—in attempts to secure either the
initial assignment of the right to the rent or in ousting others from their position of
privilege. These resources are employed unproductively but have social value in
alternative employment.
All this is largely unobserved and certainly not recorded by any statistical agency
and reported to the public. This makes it hard to know how large these loses really
are. Fortunately, the second insight—the invertability hypothesis—can help: the
social loss can be inferred through contest-models from the size of the
contestable rent. It is, in other words, possible to ‘‘invert’’ the process and use
the size of the observable rents to infer the unobserved social cost of rent seeking. A
very extensive literature on rent dissipation, including Tullock’s (1980) paper on
efficient rent seeking, has subsequently demonstrated that the possible relations
between the observable rent to the underlying rent-seeking expense are complex and
contingent on many assumptions or influences.2
2.2 Definitions and taxonomy
In order to examine the influence that the two core insights from the rent-seeking
literature have had on the corruption literature, the starting point must be to settle on
definitions of what the two social phenomena are and to develop a workable
taxonomy that can help us organize the material.
The standard definition of ‘‘rent seeking’’ is the quest for privileged benefits from
government [see, for example, Hillman (2013)]. While there is general agreement
on this definition, it has proved much harder to converge on a widely accepted
definition of corruption.3 An often used definition of corruption amongst economists
2 See, e.g., Hillman and Samet (1987) on all-pay auctions, Ursprung (1990) on rents as public goods, and
Aidt and Hillman (2008) on rents that endure over time and may require re-contesting.
3 Williams (2000) contains a collection of social science articles that dwell more deeply into the
definitional issues.
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is ‘‘sale by government officials of government property for private gain’’ (Shleifer
and Vishny 1993) or situations where ‘‘the power of public office is used for
personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game’’ (Jain 2001).
Taking these definitions at face value, it is clearly possible to have rent seeking
without corruption and vice versa. If, for example, a government official is charged
with allocating mobile phone licenses and the rules specify that he must select the
company that makes the ‘‘most convincing case for efficient service delivery’’ and if
he follows this rule to the best of his ability, then there is no corruption. Yet, there
will be a lot of rent seeking. The mobile phone companies will expend vast
resources on making their case for being the best for the job. Conversely, it is also
possible to have corruption without rent seeking. Suppose, for example, that one of
the companies pays a bribe to obtain the license without any checks on its ability to
deliver the services efficiently (and no one else makes any effort to show their
fitness for the job), then we clearly have a situation of corruption but without any
real resources have been used unproductively in rent-seeking activities. This line of
reasoning, however, gives the impression that corruption and rent seeking are
entirely different social phenomena and that is misleading and unhelpful. The
problem is that the definition of corruption used in the economics literature is too
narrow.
It is more fruitful, as suggested by Lambsdorff (2002, p. 98), to employ a broader
definition. Thus, let me define corruption as a special means by which private agents
may seek to pursue their interest in competition for preferential treatment by
government officials or politicians and where the ‘‘means’’ are valued by the
recipient. The primary example of a ‘‘special means’’ is a bribe—a monetary
payment in return for preferential treatment. The use of personal contacts
(favouritism) according to the principle ‘‘you help me and I will help you’’ is
another example.
This definition alongside the definition of rent seeking itself highlights an
important consideration. It matters a lot from a social point of view, if the ‘‘means’’
of seeking preferential treatment involves the outputs or income from the production
process or it involves the direct use of factors of production. In the first case, the
available factors of production are employed to produce output and generate income
to the factor owners, i.e., the economy is on the production frontier (maybe on a
second best frontier, but nonetheless on the frontier). Some of the income thus
generated may be used to seek rents and preferential treatment. This is the situation
envisaged by much of the corruption literature. In the second case, factors of
production, for example, labour, which could have been employed in production of
output are deployed in the process of seeking rents—people who could become
entrepreneurs become lobbyists. As a consequence, the economy produces below its
production frontier and output and income is lost. This is the situation envisaged by
the rent-seeking literature which is concerned with the efficiency losses due to
unproductive use of resources in the quest for rents.
Using the definitions, corruption and rent seeking can be combined as instances
of influence-seeking activities. Such activities can be distinguished along two
dimensions: whether the gatekeeper who assigns the rent benefits from the
influence-seeking activities and whether the influence-seeking activity involves a
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transfer of income (bribe) or unproductive use of resources. This gives rise to the
two-by-two taxonomy in Table 1a and the illustrative examples in Table 1b.
According to this taxonomy, pure corruption refers to the case where competition
for preferential treatment is such that the gatekeeper benefits from the influence-
seeking expenses/activities in the way of a costless income transfer from the
beneficiary to the gatekeeper. Pure rent seeking refers to the situation in which
competition for preferential treatment is such that the gatekeeper does not benefit
from the influence-seeking expenses/activities, which represent unproductive use of
factors of production. The case of impure corruption emerges if the income transfer
is associated with a transaction cost such that the value of the income transfer to the
gatekeeper is lower than the cost to those paying the transfer. Impure rent seeking
emerges if the unproductive use of factors of production in seeking influence may,
in fact, benefit the gatekeeper.
There are, of course, a whole raft of intermediate cases and many other
distinctions can be made (corruption is restricted to a few competitors while rent
seeking is open to all; corruption is not legal, while rent seeking is, etc.), but the
two-dimensional taxonomy is, at the very least, helpful in clarifying the link
between the rent-seeking and corruption literature. Most of the corruption literature
is concerned with situations where the gatekeeper gains and the influence-seeking
activity represents an income transfer. Bribery is the classical example of this which
is often viewed as a costless transfer (e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1975; Lui 1985). In
reality, even bribery is associated with transaction costs (e.g., Tirole 1992). This
reduces the value of the bribe for the gatekeeper and in the limit, makes it worthless.
The classical rent-seeking literature, including the examples given by Tullock
(1967) and the analysis in Hillman and Samet (1987) and many other papers on rent
dissipation is about pure rent seeking: real resources are being employed in seeking,
say, a government-sponsored monopoly rent, which is assigned without any gain to
the official who assigns it. However, it is possible to envisage cases in which the
gatekeeper may gain. The literature on contest design, for example, engages with
the possibility that the rent-seeking expense is, in fact, valued by the government
official who assigns the underlying rent (Gradstein and Konrad 1999; Epstein and
Nitzan 2015). This leads to what I call contestable bribery in Table 1b.
Table 1 Taxonomy of influence-seeking activities
Means/gains Gatekeeper does not gain Gatekeeper gains
(a) General taxonomy
Income transfer Impure corruption Pure corruption
Factor of production Pure rent seeking Impure rent seeking
(b) Examples of taxonomy
Income transfers Bribes with transaction costs
Tirole (1992)
Bribes with no transaction costs
Rose-Ackerman (1975)
Factor of production Advocacy, argumentation
Tullock (1967)
Contestable bribery
Gradstein and Konrad (1999)
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3 Overview of the corruption literature
The theoretical corruption literature has evolved along two main branches.4 They
are
1. The helping hand type of corruption: Corruption arises when a benevolent
principal delegates decision making power to a non-benevolent agent. The level
of corruption depends on the costs and benefits of designing optimal
institutions. Corruption is optimal.
2. The grabbing hand type of corruption: Corruption arises because non-
benevolent government officials introduce inefficient policies in order to
extract rents from the private sector. The level of corruption depends on the
incentives embodied in existing (often suboptimal) institutions and policies.
Corruption is not optimal.
The first branch of literature has its origin in the law and economics and in the
organisational economics literatures, with classical contributions by Becker and
Stigler (1974), Rose-Ackerman (1975), and Tirole (1992, 1994) and, more recent
contributions, by Laffont and Guessan (1999), Acemoglu and Verdier (2000),
Dabla-Norris (2002), and Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2007) amongst many others. A
typical ‘‘helping hand’’ scenario, which we shall use as a heuristic devise below, is
environmental regulation. Un-internalised and socially harmful externalities provide
a prima facie case for government intervention and a benevolent government would
want to impose a correction. In practice, the task of doing so is delegated to a
bureaucracy. The officials of the bureaucracy will amongst other things be tasked
with checking that the polluting firms abide by the regulations. The problem,
however, is that it is impossible for the government to monitor the officials
perfectly. This leaves room for collusion between the firms and the officials. Any
given official may agree to accept a bribe for not reporting violations of the
regulations. Or the regulator may simply come to identify with the regulated firm.
The benevolent government tries to avoid this by designing institutions (monitoring,
wage structures, penalties) to maximise social welfare, but it is costly to design such
institutions. It may, therefore, be optimal to accept a residual of corruption and rule
violation. That is, corruption within this conception is, in fact, optimal in a second
best sense.
The second strand of literature starts from the Tullock dictum ‘‘people are
people’’ and does not assume any degree of benevolence in the conduct of the
government. Examples of contributions to this literature include Shleifer and Vishny
(1993), Bliss and di Tella (1997), and Aidt and Dutta (2008). A typical ‘‘grabbing
hand’’ scenario, which we shall also explore below, is entry regulation. Suppose that
there are no good welfare economics reasons for restricting entry into an industry.
Yet, a corruptible government official or politician may nonetheless introduce a
4 Aidt (2003) lists two additional categories, called efficient corruption and self-reinforcing corruption.
For the purpose of evaluating the influence of the rent-seeking literature on the corruption literature, it is,
however, sufficient to zoom in on the two main categories listed in the text. For other classifications, see
Tanzi (1998), Rose-Ackerman (1999) or Jain (2001).
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license system that restricts entry. The reason is that such regulation creates rents
through artificial scarcity. As a consequence, potential producers in the industry is
willing to pay a bribe to obtain a license. A leviathan-type politician would, then,
issue the bribe maximising number of licences and collect the largest possible bribe
income. In practice, however, institutional constraints may impose some limits of
this sort of behaviour. The level of corruption depends on given institutional
structures, culture, and history and is, in general, sub-optimal. Moreover, the type of
corruption is endogenous to the political regime. Charap and Harm (2002) point out
that this is a natural consequence of the predatory strategies that ‘‘rulers’’ operating
under different constraints employ to extract rents from the economy. For example,
in a dictatorship, a corrupt and low-paid bureaucracy, either of the competitive or
monopolistic type, can at the same time help the dictator to maintain power and to
extract rents from the economy. In contrast, in a functioning democracy, the
preferred vehicle for rent extraction becomes interest group contributions to
political campaigns.
4 The influence of the rent-seeking literature on the study of corruption
We can use the two examples developed above to evaluate the influence of the rent-
seeking literature on the study of the economics of corruption. In the ‘‘helping
hand’’ scenario, a corruptible public official may share a rent with the firm that he is
meant to regulate by accepting a bribe in return for turning a blind eye to
environmental violations. The rent itself is created by asymmetric information and
imperfect monitoring. There is a social loss involved because of socially undesirable
environmental damage. This is, however, optimal given the costs and benefits of
designing incentives. It is important for this conclusion that the information rent is
not contestable and the influence-seeking activity—offering a bribe—is a pure
transfer. It is also important that the bribe does not by itself involve a social loss,
although one could imagine that transaction costs would reduce the value of the
bribe received below the utility cost of paying it. Yet, the point remains that the
receiver, the government official, values the bribe. In this type of model, influence
seeking is limited to what I termed pure (or at worst impure) corruption in Table 1a.
It is simply a transfer of resources from one set of agents to another. There is no
social loss involved over and above the fact that public policy is distorted.
In the grabbing hand scenario, rents have to be created by the public official
before bribes can be collected. This is done by introducing a license system which
restricts entry to economic activity and creates artificial scarcity. This, by itself,
involve a social loss. Yet, the public official has a private incentive to do this
because he can extract some or all of the rent from the would-be producers who are
willing to offer a bribe to be ‘‘assigned’’ the scarcity rent. Again, the bribe is a pure
transfer between producers and public officials, and, given and take, transaction
costs, it does not constitute a social loss in and by itself. Although the rent created
by each licence is contestable, the structure of the contest is such that competition
takes place through bribery. It does not involve any persuasion, advocacy or any
other activity which would involve ‘‘burning’’ real resources with positive shadow
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prices and which might not benefit the public official personally in the process of
seeking the rent conferred by the production licence.
The core insight from Tullock’s seminal paper that these approaches (and the
corruption literature more generally) have not taken up is the notion of ‘‘rent
contestability’’. Consider the case of monopoly rents created by entry restrictions.
Tullock (1967) points out that, if the monopoly rent is contestable, it will attract real
resources, which he assumed was equal to its value. This adds the ‘‘Tullock
rectangle’’ to the standard deadweight cost of monopoly. If, in contrast, the
monopoly right were secured by paying the public official in charge a bribe, it
would appear that the additional cost would vanish: the bribe is ‘‘just’’ a transfers
from one party to another. However, this misses the point. Posner (1975) puts it like
this: ‘‘It might seem that where monopoly is obtained by bribery of government
officials, the additional loss of monopoly [the rent-seeking cost] would be
eliminated since a bribe is a pure transfer. In fact, however, bribery merely shifts
the monopoly profit to the officials receiving the bribe and draws real resources into
the activity of becoming the official who is in the position to receive these bribes’’
(p. 82).5
This is a very important point which has been largely ignored in the corruption
literature, but not entirely. Hillman and Katz (1987) take up the baton in their paper
‘‘Hierarchical structure and the social costs of bribes and transfers’’.6 Their starting
point is that agents who seek a rent may use bribery—transfers of income—to gain
access to the rent. While these bribes do not (necessarily) involve any social loss,
the bribe income stream may be contestable. This happens when bribe income is a
prize that can be won through a contest for particular positions in government, i.e.,
the positions to which the bribes accrue are themselves contestable. In the
environmental regulation scenario, for example, being appointed to oversee
regulated firms may be open to many potential officials who all know that
obtaining the appointment will allow them to extract bribes from the firms that they
oversee. If so, a pure rent-seeking contest will follow and the resources employed in
winning that contest may well be time and effort—factors of production that could
be used productively. Consequently, the rent created by the corruption opportunity
offered by asymmetric information and imperfect monitoring, not only represents a
case of pure corruption. It also represents a case of pure rent seeking because the
position in the government bureaucracy is a contestable rent. The situation becomes
even worse when influence seeking takes place within a hierarchy in which lower-
down officials pass some of the bribe income on to higher-up officials. In this case,
each position becomes a contestable rent with an associated social cost of
contestability (Hillman and Katz 1987). Another reason why the rent-seeking cost is
likely to be large in this case is that the rents are private, i.e., the prize of obtaining a
position in the hierarchy is a private revenue stream. Ursprung (1990) has shown
that the distinction between private and public-goods rents is very important for the
5 Krueger (1974, pp. 292–293) makes a similar point.
6 Hillman and Ursprung (2000) describe nested contests in which outsiders compete to be insiders who
compete directly for rents. Political culture determines the openness of the contests to outsiders.
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overall social cost. The degree of rent dissipation is much larger with private than
with public-goods rents.
The point about contestability is also taken up in a sequence of studies of
misallocation of talent and corruption, although the connection to the rent-seeking
literature is not always made explicit. The general idea in this literature is that
talented people can be employed as private sector entrepreneurs (or in some other
productive job) or as government bureaucrats. Positions in the public sector offer
corruption possibilities and government officials can benefit personally from the
rents they control (created by, for example, collusion allowed by asymmetric
information as in the example above). Controlling these rents is a contestable prize
and agents will seek employment in the government sector to gain access to them. If
the most talented people seek these jobs, there will be misallocation of talent:
individuals who should have become productive entrepreneurs become rent seekers
(in the sense of pure rent seeking) instead. The social costs of rent seeking is, then,
the economic consequences of this misallocation of talent, which could be lower
growth or income, plus, of course, the policy distortion created by bribery in the first
place.
Murphy et al. (1991) develop this logic in a model of allocation of talent in which
the government serves no particular purpose. However, government jobs offer the
possibility to create and extract rents to the personal benefit of the holder of the job
(which is their definition of corruption). The analysis emphasizes that talent is often
general and talented individuals can be successful in many different jobs, including
in jobs that offer pure corruption possibilities and in entrepreneurial jobs. More able
people may be able to extract more rents, and if this advantage is sufficiently large,
the most talented will seek jobs in the public sector because those jobs offer
corruption opportunities. The social cost is too little innovation and lower economic
growth [see also Murphy et al. (1993)].
The underlying premise of this analysis is that more able people are good at both
rent seeking and productive activities. This appears plausible: many lobbyists are
very clever, and could have put their talent to productive use in the biotech or some
other frontier industry rather than use their abilities in the lobbying industry.
However, this is not the only reason why corruption opportunities in the public
sector can lead to misallocation of talent. Acemoglu and Verdier (1998, 2001) point
to another more subtle mechanism. In their analysis, the government bureaucracy
has a socially valuable purpose, namely to enforce contracts that support productive
investment. This, however, creates corruption possibilities since individual bureau-
crats may decide not to enforce a contract in return for a payment from the party that
benefits. Anticipating this makes investment unprofitable ex ante and too little or no
investment will be undertaken. The benevolent government may try to solve this
problem by paying efficiency wages. This, however, generates a social cost because
it attracts individuals to the public sector with no comparative advantage in that
sector. The rent-seeking cost is indirect in this model: it is not so much the fact that
government jobs offer corruption possibilities that is the source of the problem.
Rather, it is the benevolent government’s attempt to control corruption by paying
above market wages that induces the misallocation of talent.
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5 The influence of the corruption literature on the study of rent seeking
While the corruption literature, leaving the exceptions noted above aside, could
learn from the rent-seeking literature, it is not a one-way street. The rent-seeking
literature can also learn from the corruption literature, or, at least, part of it.
Most importantly, the ‘‘grabbing hand’’ corruption literature emphasises rent
creation: corrupt officials create rents which they extract for themselves via bribery.
They do so by introducing artificial scarcity via licenses, permissions, cumbersome
procedures, etc. In contrast, in the rent-seeking literature, the rents are often (but
obviously not always) taken as given; they are there for ‘‘whatever reason’’. It is
plain that the incentive of a public official to create artificial scarcity depends
critically on whether he or she can subsequently benefit from the rent thus created.
Government officials have little incentive to create rents if they cannot benefit from
them (Hillman 2015). Bribery allows officials the maximum flexibility in capturing
the rent they have created. As emphasized by Lambsdorff (2002), this makes
corruption, understood as influence-seeking activities from which officials person-
ally benefit, particularly harmful to society: corruption possibilities encourage rent
creation. If, instead, rent creation triggers influence-seeking activities which do not
directly benefit the official and may even be costly to him or her because it involves
costly engagement with lobbyists and special interests, then the incentive to create
the rent in the first place is decreased.
In short, corruption encourages rent creation because it allows the creator of the
rent to benefit personally. To quote Tullock (1996, p. 8) in his discussion of
corruption in nineteenth century China, ‘‘the official actually write the laws with the
intent of being bribed to permit people to avoid carrying out the law.’’ In contrast, if
bribery for some reason becomes impossible or unattractive (e.g., because of better
control structures) and, as a consequence, most rents will be contested in ways that
do not benefit the official, then he or she might decide that it is time to repeal the
regulation that generated the rent in the first place and be deterred from thinking up
ways to create new rents. An implication, then, is that bribery is particularly harmful
from a social point of view. It underlies the incentive for officials to create rents.
This is socially harmful in itself because it involves creating artificial scarcity and
this creates deadweight losses. On top of that, bribery and corruption more broadly
maximise the risk of triggering costly contests related to obtaining the positions in
government that enable the bribes to be collected.
While the consequences of the symbiotic relationship between rent creation and
corruption has yet to be fully explored in the rent-seeking literature in general, the
literature on contest design, initiated by Gradstein and Konrad (1999) and explored
in Mealem and Nitzan (2015) amongst others, provides the foundation for a bridge
between the two literatures. It studies how a contest might be designed if the ‘‘rent-
seeking effort’’ is beneficial to the contest designer who then has an interest in
maximising ‘‘effort’’. This incentive is particularly strong if the ‘‘effort’’ is a bribe
transfer to the contest designer. A promising research programme would be to
explore more deeply the interplay between corruption, rent creation and contest
design.
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6 The empirics of corruption and rent seeking
The past 30 years have seen a massive empirical research effort aimed at
understanding the causes and consequences of (pure) corruption (see, e.g., Paldam
2002; Lambsdorff 2005; Svensson 2005; Treisman 2007; Aidt 2011a). This research
agenda has been fuelled by cross country data on corruption perceptions and more
recently by individual or firm level survey data on experienced corruption. These
types of data have attracted a fair amount of critique and rightly so.7 Yet, the
empirical corruption literature clearly points to substantial economic costs of
corruption. Mauro (1995), for example, finds a small negative growth effect and a
large negative effect of corruption on investment. Subsequent research has shown
that the growth effect interacts with the underlying quality of institutions (Aidt et al.
2008; Me´ndez and Sepu´lveda 2006; Me´on and Weill 2010) and that corruption has a
detrimental impact on sustainable development (Aidt 2011b). Other studies have
shown that corruption increases inequality (Gupta et al. 2002) and distorts fiscal and
monetary policy and the composition of government spending (e.g., Mauro 1998;
Hessami 2014; Dimakou 2015). Expenditure tracking studies undertaken in many
countries have demonstrated how vast amounts of public resources intended for
schools and other public spending programmes simply disappear and never reach
the intended beneficiaries (Reinikka and Svensson 2004).
Unlike the study of corruption, empirical research on rent seeking can hardly be
said to be booming.8 The existing research efforts have partly been guided by the
invertability hypothesis and partly by attempts to measure rent seeking costs
directly. Krueger (1974), Posner (1975) and Cowling and Mueller (1978) pioneered
the indirect method based on the invertability hypothesis. Krueger (1974) estimated
that the welfare loss from trade intervention in India and Turkey in the 1960s was
between 7 and 15 % of GNP. Posner (1975) estimated the rent seeking cost
associated with monopoly regulation in the USA to be between 5 and 32 % of
industry sales. Cowling and Mueller (1978) found that the total welfare cost of
monopoly in the US and the UK, respectively, was 13 and 7 % of gross corporate
product. These studies and others like them assume full rent dissipation. The
theoretical literature on rent seeking contests shows that this assumption is only
valid in special cases and that the degree of dissipation depends on the contest
function, on risk preferences, on the nature of the prize being sought, and on many
other features. Employing the full dissipation assumption is, therefore, likely to
inflate the cost estimates. Lopez and Pagoulatos (1994) is a rare example of a study
that estimates the degree of rent dissipation. They find, in an application to US trade
policy, that 67 % of the value of the available rent is dissipated and estimate the
total social loss of trade barriers in the US to be 12.5 % of the value of domestic
consumption. Hazlett and Michaels (1993) also estimate dissipation ratios. They
explore a natural experience induced by a cellular telephone licence lottery in the
1980s in the USA and find that the ratio was 31.2 % on average.
7 See the critical discussion in Kaufmann et al. (2006).
8 Del Rosal (2011) offers a critical survey of the empirical rent-seeking literature.
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An alternative approach is to estimate the social cost of rent seeking simply by
adding observable expenditures on rent seeking related activities up. A typical
finding is that the actual money spent on lobbying (in the USA) is low relative to the
value of the rents at stake—an observation Tullock (1988) himself made when he
rhetorically asked why the total amount of resources going into politics appear to be
small relative to the value of the prizes that can potentially be won.9 Others have
gone further than counting lobbying expenses and added more expenditures to the
rent seeking bill (e.g., expenditures on advertising, on crime prevention, or on
property rights disputes) or tried to estimate rent seeking costs from ‘‘excess’’
presence of certain types of economic activities in capital cities (e.g., sit-down
restaurants). The estimates emerging from this type of research vary a lot in size,
from 0.2 to 23.7 % of GDP (Del Rosal 2011, Table 2). The fundamental problem
with this approach clearly is that it requires an up-front judgement about what
constitutes rent seeking costs, and doing that objectively is hard, if not impossible.
The empirical rent-seeking literature suggests that rent dissipation is incomplete,
and that the total rent seeking cost, therefore, could be a lot smaller than the value of
the rents. In contrast, the empirical corruption literature points to substantial welfare
costs of corruption and strongly suggests that corruption is a major obstacle to
economic development. Of course, one could take the view that corruption costs in
practise are correlated with rent seeking costs. However, doing so would diverge
attention away from the very important task of quantifying the true cost of rent
seeking. One way out of this conundrum is to base empirical research on rent
seeking more firmly on rent seeking theory and to build structural models that can
be matched to observable data on policy outcomes, campaign contributions,
employment in the lobbying industry, etc. and in that way help us back out the true
cost of public policy.
7 Conclusion
It is surprising that the corruption and rent-seeking literatures have not crisscrossed
more than it appears to have been the case. After all, they are both concerned with
what I have called influence-seeking activities and there is clearly scope for fruitful
cross fertilization. The corruption literature, both the branch that focuses on
principal-agent relationships within government and the branch that focusses on
leviathan-type governments, has largely ignored the ‘‘missiles seek heat hypothesis’’
of rent seeking, i.e., the notion that the presence of contestable rents elicits socially
costly activities aimed at winning the rents. The consequences of this are two-fold.
First, the literature underestimates the value of corruption-control policies. The
overriding objective of the law and economics and organisational economics
9 Mixon (2002), for example, finds that interest group contributions related to obtaining social security
funds in the USA amount to only 0.2 % of the value of the potential rents. Goldberg and Maggi (1999)
estimate the weight given to social welfare relative to special interest groups in the setting of US trade
policy. Their results suggest that the influence of special interests is very small, which, again, suggests
that the welfare cost of rent seeking is of limited importance. Hillman and Ursprung (2016) discuss
reasons why there appear to be less rent seeking and less rent dissipation than might be expected.
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literature on corruption is precisely to devise and evaluate such policies. A fruitful
research project would be integrate the notion of contestable rents and the
associated rent-seeking cost into the principal-agent models of corruption and to
reconsider existing results about socially optimal levels of corruption. Second, the
literature underestimates the social cost of corruption. Insofar as corruption is
conceptualized as a costless transfer of income from one party to another, it may
appear that corruption is a social problem only because it leads to policy distortions
and because it leads to inequitable and unfair allocations of public resources and
funds. The rent-seeking literature would insist adding Tullock rectangles on the
debit side. We just need to quantify them.
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